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Abstract
We have previously presented a critique of the standard Marshallian
theory of the firm, and developed an alternative formulation that better
agreed with the results of simulation. An incorrect mathematical fact
was used in our previous presentation. This paper deals with correcting
the derivation of the Keen equilibrium, and generalising the result to the
asymmetric case. As well, we discuss the notion of rationality employed,
and how this plays out in a two player version of the game.
1 Introduction
Keen [3, Ch 4] pointed out a fundamental flaw with the standard Marshallian
theory of the firm, whereby the market demand function P (Q) (price of a good
given total market production Q) is assumed to be a decreasing function of
Q (i.e. P ′(Q) < 0), yet at the same time, for a large number of firms, each
individual firm’s production qi has no effect on market price, ie ∂P/∂qi = 0.
Yet it is easy to see from elementary calculus, that these two conditions cannot
be true simultaneously, as first noted by Stigler [7].
Marshallian analysis proceeds under this assumption that individual firms’
actions have no effect on the market, leading to the profit maximum for each
firm to occur when it’s marginal cost is equal to the market price.
In [5, 4], we argue that the economy’s equilibrium will not occur at the
zero of the partial derivative of the individual profit function, but rather when
the total derivative of each individual profit with respect to market production
is simultaneously satisfied. This leads to a revised prediction of the difference
between market price and marginal cost being related to the slope of the demand
curve:
P (Q)−MC(qi) = −nqiP
′(Q) (1)
Furthermore, a simple reactive rational agent model of the firm produced
results compatible with the Keen equilibrium, and not the Cournot-Nash equi-
librium predicted from standard Marshallian analysis. It should be pointed out
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that this agent model makes neither the partial derivative assumption of Mar-
shallian analysis, nor the total derivative assumption of Keen’s analysis, but
rather the agents seek to always optimise their profits assuming the past is a
guide to the future.
Anglin [2] critiqued our 2006 paper, but the critique was not without its own
mathematical difficulties. We extensively rebutted his paper in a submission to
the same journal in which our 2006 paper, and Anglin’s critique appeared. This
was rejected on editorial privilege. We chose not to publish the rebuttal in
another journal, as the rebuttal doesn’t advance the state of the field, but have
made it available via arXiv [6], for thos who might be interested.
Nevertheless, in the course of corresponding with Anglin, the main issue
bothering Anglin was identified as an erroneous mathematical assumption we
made for the value of dqi/dQ, for which no such assumption can be made.
This paper serves to correct the analysis, and also correctly generalise the Keen
analysis to the asymmetric firm case. As a consequence, our previous attempt
described in section 3 of [4], which Anglin ridiculed as “conjectural variation”,
is no longer relevant.
The purpose of this paper is not to rebut Anglin’s paper, but to correct a
problematic assertion in our work, and consequently extend the Keen analysis
to asymmetric firm response.
2 The profit formula
We take as our starting point, the usual profit formula of a single product market
with n firms:
pii = qiP (Q)−
∫ qi
0
MC(qi)dqi, (2)
where pii is the profit obtained by firm i, as a function of its production qi,
and the total market production Q =
∑
i qi. The function P (Q) is the demand
curve, namely the price the good achieves when Q items of the good is available
on the market. In the following, P (Q) is taken to be a monotonically decreasing
curve (P ′ < 0). The function MC(qi) is the marginal cost of producing an extra
item of the good, given that a firm is producing qi items.
3 Rationality
The key concept of the rational agent, or homo economicus is that the agent
chooses from an array of actions so as to maximise some utility function. In the
context of the theory of the firm, the utility functions are given by pii in eq (2),
and the choices are the production values chosen by the individual firms.
Intrinsic to the notion of rationality is the property of determinism. Given
a single best course of action that maximises utility, the agent must choose that
action. Only where two equally good courses of action occur, might the agents
behave stochastically. This deterministic behaviour of the agents is the key to
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understanding the stability of the Keen equilibrium, and the instability of the
Cournot equilibrium, which is the outcome of traditional Marshallian analysis.
When setting up a game, it is important to circumscribe what information
the agents have access to. Clearly, if the agents know what the total market
production Q will be in the next cycle, as well as their marginal cost MC, the
rational value of qi can be found by setting the partial derivative of pii to zero:
∂pii
∂qi
= P + qi
∂P
∂qi
−MC(qi) = 0. (3)
Indeed, the Marshallian theory further assumes that in the limit as the
number of firms n tends to infinity, the term ∂P/∂qi → 0, to arrive at the
ultimate result that price will tend to the marginal cost (assuming a unique
marginal cost exists over all firms)[1, p. 322]. This assumption is strictly false,
as shown by [7]. Instead, ∂P/∂qi = dP/dQ, which is independent of the number
firms in the economy. The Cournot-Nash model starts with each agent knowing
that all other agents are rational, and their marginal cost curves, consequently
(under the right circumstances) being able to predict the optimal production
levels for each agent. Therefore, the total production Q is predictable, and
equation (3) should hold. Furthermore, for certain distributions of market share
(eg the symmetric case of equal market share where qi = Q/n), individual
production levels vanish in the limit n → ∞. Therefore P → MC. This result
is known as the Cournot theorem.
However, it is completely unrealistic for the firms to be able to predict market
production (and hence price). Firms cannot know whether their competitors
will act completely rationally, and details such as the marginal cost curve for
each firm, and even the total number of players is unlikely to be known. So
equation (3) cannot be correct. Instead, firms can really only assume that the
price tomorrow will most likely be similar today, and that the best they can
do is incrementally adjust their output to “grope for” the optimal production
value. So in our model, firms have a choice between increasing production or
decreasing it. If the previous round’s production change caused a rise in profits,
the rational thing to do is to repeat the action. If, on the other hand, it leads
to a decrease in profit, the opposite action should be taken. At equilibrium, one
would expect the production to be continuously increased and decreased in a
cycle with no net movement.
4 Game theoretic analysis of the Cournot equi-
librium
For simplicity, assume a two firm system with identical constant marginal costs,
that has been initialised at its Cournot equilibrium (P +QP ′/2−MC = 0, q1 =
q2 = Q/2). There are three possible outcomes for the next step:
1. Both firms increase production. This reduces the price fetched for each
firm. The right hand side of equation 3 becomes negative, reducing the
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profits of both firms. The logical next step is for both firms to decrease
production, which is covered under item 3
2. One firm increases production whilst the other decreases it. If the pro-
duction increment is the same in each case, then the market price does
not change. The net effect is of one firm gaining market share at the ex-
pense of the other. In this case, the firm losing market share will switch
to increasing production, whilst the other firm will continue increasing
production. This is situation described by item 1.
If the production increments differed between firms, then there are two
cases: if the firm with larger increment increases, and the increment is
sufficiently big, then profit levels will fall for both firms. The dynamics
returns to the original (Cournot) point. Otherwise, the firm losing market
share will switch to increasing, which is situation 1.
3. Both firms decrease production. In this case, provided the price is higher
than the monopoly price, both firms’ profits will rise, leading to another
round of production decreases.
The net result is that the Cournot equilibrium is unstable in the direction
of both firms decreasing production. The n-firm case can be analysed in the
same way [5]. The situation where the majority of firms are decreasing their
production simultaneously will occur by chance within a few cycles of the system
initialisation. From there, the entrainment of all firms into the production-
reducing behaviour happens rapidly, until the system stabilises at monopoly
prices.
It is important to note, that this effect depends on the deterministic nature
of the agent behaviour, a result of the assumption of rationality. Presumably,
most real economic agents are not as rational as this, and the introduction of
30% irrationality into the agents is sufficient to ensure competitive pricing [5].
5 Derivation of the Keen equilibrium
Mathematically, global equilibrium will occur when all partial derivatives ∂pii/∂qj
vanish. However, this situation can never pertain, as ∀i 6= j, ∂pii/∂qj = qiP
′ <
0, except possibly for the trivial solution Q = 0.
Instead we propose the condition that all firm’s profits are maximised with
respect to total industry output dpii/dQ = 0. This constrains the dynamics
of firms’ outputs to an n − 1-dimensional polyhedron, but otherwise does not
specify what the individual firms should do. As an equilibrium condition, it is
vulnerable to a single firm “stealing” market share. However, no firm acts in
isolation. The other firms will react, negating the benefit obtained by first firm,
causing the system to settle back to the dpii/dQ = 0 manifold.
The derivation of the Keen equilibrium follows the presentation in [4]. The
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total derivative of an individual firm’s profit is given by
dpii
dQ
= P
dqi
dQ
+ qi
dP
dQ
−MC(qi)
dqi
dQ
(4)
which is zero at the Keen equilibrium.
In terms of the model introduced in §4, there is no absolute equilibrium,
but rather a limit cycle where the individual firms are “jiggling” their outputs
around the equilibrium value. If we average over this limit cycle, and retaining
only zeroth order terms in ∆qi, we get〈
dpii
dQ
〉
= P (〈Q〉)
〈
dqi
dQ
〉
+ 〈qi〉P
′(〈Q〉) −MC(〈qi〉)
〈
dqi
dQ
〉
= Pθi + qiP
′ −MC(qi)θi = 0. (5)
where θi = 〈dqi/dQ〉 and the terms P , P
′ and qi refer to the equilibrium average
values of these quantities. The θi terms are normalised:
∑
i θi = dQ/dQ = 1.
They can be considered to be the (normalised) responsiveness of the firms to
changing market conditions
The symmetric firm case corresponds to setting θi = 1/n, which leads to the
equation:
P + nqiP
′ −MC(qi) = 0 (6)
which is equation (6) of [4].
In our previous expositions [4, 5], we incorrectly set dqi/dQ =
∑
j ∂qj/∂qi =
1, which as pointed out in a critique by Paul Anglin[2], when coupled with
qi(Q = 0) = 0 leads to the unjustifiable conclusion that qi = Q/n at all times.
Now, in equation (5), the values θi only refer to the derivatives at equilibrium,
so there is no necessity for (6) to entail an equi-partition of the market share.
6 Testing the Keen equilibrium
We can use an agent-based computational model based on the model introduced
in §4 to test the Keen equilibrium, or more specifically, equation (5). The terms
P (Q), qi andMCi are all available as part of the model. In addition, each agent
has an attribute δi, which is the amount that agent i varies its production up
or down each time step.
We can compute the quantity θi by averaging ∆qi/∆Q over θw = 10 time
steps.
In the following experiment with 1000 firms, we used a linear pricing func-
tion P = 11−Q/3, and constant marginal costs MCi drawn uniformly from the
range [0.5, 0.5). The δi increments were drawn from a half normal distribution
— ie the absolute values of normally distributed deviates with zero mean and
standard deviation 0.002/n. The code implementing the model, and the experi-
mental parameter script is available as firmmodel.1.D7, from the EcoLab website
(http://ecolab.sf.net).
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Figure 1: Histogram of the statistic qiP
′+ θi(P −MCi) for 1378 replications of
the 1000 firm model. Most of the values are clustered close to zero, but a sizable
minority have non-zero negative values. The left hand half of the histogram also
has non-zero bins, but are not visible with the shown vertical scale
Figure 1 shows the histogram of values taken by the statistic qiP
′ + θi(P −
Mi) for the 1000 firms over 1378 replications. The vast majority of observed
values are consistent with zero, the predicted value of eq (5), however there
is a significant minority of outliers, which are not explained within the theory
presented in §5.
We can, however, consider the statistic ξ = qiP
′/(Mi − P ), which in the
Cournot theory should be one by (3). Figure 2 shows a histogram of ξ for a
single run of the 1000 firm model. The values approximately fit a lognormal
distribution, from which we can see that value ξ = 1 lies some 35 “sigmas” to
the right of the mean, ie the Cournot prediction (3) is excluded to the tune of
p ≈ 10−267.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed the behaviour of an n-player game of rational,
but not clairvoyant, agents. This exhibits a phase of coordinated behaviour of
the agents that brings market prices to near monopoly levels due to the very
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Figure 2: Histogram of the statistic qiP
′/(MCi−P ) for a single run of the 1000
firm model. The dashed line shows a fitted log-normal distribution.
rationality of the agents rather than any overt coordination mechanism. We
use numerical simulations to reject the traditional Cournot-Nash solution of the
game.
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